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	 The Regulatory Scheme Under the Clean Water
Act ("CWA"), Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 
1566 (1977).
As recently noted by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, the CWA is strong medicine.
Texas Municipal Power Agency V. Admr. of the
United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 836 F.2d 1482, 1488 (5th Cir. 1988).
The CWA prohibits the discharge of any
Ca'
	
	 pollutant into the nation's waters unless
such discharge is authorized by a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit issued either by EPA or by
a state possessing "delegated" permit issu-
ance authority. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. A
companion provision prohibits the discharge
of dredged or fill material into the
"navigable waters" and adjacent wetlands.
This "Section 404" permit program is admin-
istered jointly by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") and the Environmental
r
Protection Agency ("EPA"). See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(b). The CWA provides powerful
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance
with NPDES and Section 404 permits. Direct
regulatory enforcement by EPA is established
in Section 309 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
Similar enforcement authority is provided to
the Corps by Section 404(s), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(s). Section 309 also recognizes the
dual enforcement authority of authorized
NPDES states. In the absence of federal or
state enforcement, Section 505 of the CWA
provides that private citizens may commence
civil actions against any person "alleged to
be in violation of" the conditions of a
federal or state-issued NPDES permit.
33 U.S.C. § 1365.
B.	 Historical Antecedents to the Enforcement
Provisions of the CWA.
1.	 Section 309 of the CWA has three basic
sources:
a.	 Congress perceived that the
enforcement conference procedures
under the Federal Water Quality
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234,
-2-
79 Stat. 903 (1965) were ineffec-
tive. Section 309 was intended
as a "fast, effective, and
straightforward" enforcement
procedure to replace the cumber-
some mechanisms of the 1965 act.
b. Congress perceived that the more
direct enforcement provisions
under the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899,
commonly known as the Refuse Act,
33 U.S.C. § 407, had achieved
relative success within the more
limited scope of jurisdiction of
that statute.
c. the enforcement provisions of the
Clean Air Act, which had been
enacted two years earlier,
provided a model for the provi-
sions of Section 309. See
H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in
1 Congressional Research Service,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., A
Legislative History of the Water
-3-
Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, at 801-802 [hereinafter
H.R. Rep. No. 911]; S. Rep.
No. 414, 92d Cong. 1st Sess.
(1971), reprinted in
2 Congressional Research Service,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., A
Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, at 1481-1483 [herein-
after S. Rep. No. 414].
2.	 With some exceptions, the citizens
suit provision of Section 505 was
modeled on the provisions of
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
Section 505 was intended to authorize
actions by private citizens on their
own behalf in cases where federal or
state governments failed to exercise
their enforcement responsibilities
under the act. See S. Rep. No. 414 at
1482, 1499. The definition of the
term "citizen" was intended to reflect
the concept of the "private attorney
-4-
general" doctrine developed in Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. 
Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965) cert. denied, sub nom,
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference,
384 U.S. 941 (1966). 	 H.R. Rep.
No. 911 at 821. However, the
legislative history of Section 505
clearly reflects Congress' concern
that the citizens suit provisions
would lead to frivolous or harassing
litigation. The cost award provisions
in Section 505 were designed to
discourage this potential abuse. See
S. Rep. No. 414 at 1506; H.R. Rep.
No. 911 at 821. As further protec-
tion, Congress added the 60 day notice
provision in Section 505(b)(1)(A), 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A), to ensure that
federal and state agencies would have
the first opportunity to initiate
enforcement action. The Supreme Court
has recently emphasized the "inter-
stitial" role of citizen-plaintiffs
-5-
which, according to the Court, is to
"supplement rather than supplant"
governmental action. See Gwaltney of
Smithfield. Inc. v. Chesabeake Bay 
Foundation, 108 S. Ct. 376, 383
(1987).
II.	 THE REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 309, AS AMENDED BY THE 1987 WATER
QUALITY ACT
A.	 Enforcement Provisions of Section 309 Prior
to 1987.
The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control
Act ("FWPCA"), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972) provided extensive enforcement
remedies to EPA in Section 309. These
remedies consisted of administrative
compliance orders (Section 309(a)(3));
civil suits for injunctive relief
(Section 309(b)); criminal penalties for
willful or negligent violations of the act
(Section 309(c)); and judicially-imposed
civil penalties (Section 309(d)). The 1977
amendments to the act, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566 (1977), added the power to
bring civil suits for injunctive relief
against violators of pretreatment standards
adopted under Section 307 of the act.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(f).
-6-
B.	 Expansion of Enforcement Authority Under
the 1987 Amendments.
The Water Quality Act of 1987 ("WQA"),
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987),
greatly expanded the nature and scope of
EPA's enforcement authority:
1.	 section 313 of the WQA amended
Section 309(d) to raise the civil
penalty limit from $10,000 to $25,000
per day, and prescribed factors to be
considered in the determination of a
penalty. Section 313 does, however,
limit the scope of Section 309(d)
somewhat by providing that separate
penalties cannot be assessed for
violations of individual parameters in
an NPDES permit. This amendment
reconciles previous district court
rulings on how NPDES violations should
be computed. See, e.g., United States
v. Detrex Chemical Industries, Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 735, 737 (N.D. Ohio
1975); United States v. Amoco Oil Co.,
580 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (W.D. Mo.
1984).
-7-
2.	 The most important addition to EPA's
remedies is the creation of new
authority for the assessment of admin-
istrative penalties. Section 314 of
the WQA gives EPA authority to assess
administrative penalties for viola-
tions of the act by adding a new
Section 309(g) to the CWA.
Section 314 (to be codified at
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)) creates two
classes of penalties:
a. class I penalties may not exceed
$10,000 per violation up to a
maximum penalty of $25,000. EPA
is required to provide written
notice of the violation and
proposed penalty, and an oppor-
tunity for an informal hearing
within 30 days of receipt of such
notice by the violator. See WQA
§ 314(a) (to be codified at
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A)). •
b. class II penalties may not exceed
$10,000 per day for each day of
violation up to a maximum penalty
-8-
of $125,000. Because Class II
penalties are more severe, they
may not be assessed or collected
prior to a formal notice and an
opportunity for a formal record
hearing in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 554. See WQA § 314(a)
(to be codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(2)(8)).
3. A critical provision of WQA § 314(a)
(to be codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(4)) permits third parties to
participate in penalty assessment
proceedings. Third parties may also
seek administrative and judicial
review of the assessment of penalties
by EPA.
4. Section 312 of the WQA greatly
increases the criminal penalties for
"knowing" violations of the CWA.
Criminal penalties are increased for
second offenders and intentional
violators of the act. A very severe
penalty is provided for any person who
-9-
knowingly violates provisions of the
act and who knows at the time of
violation that he places another
person in "imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury." Violators are
subject to a fine of $250,000 or
imprisonment for up to 15 years or
both. Corporations can be fined up to
$1,000,000 for this offense. Second
offenders may have their penalties
doubled. Responsible corporate
officers are included within the scope
of this penalty provision. See WQA
§ 312 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)).
THE ENFORCEMENT ROLE OF THE STATES AND THE
PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY DUAL ENFORCEMENT
A.	 Role of the States Under Section 309 of the
CWA.
1.	 According to the wording and legisla-
tive history of the 1972 act, Congress
intended that the enforcement provi-
sions of the CWA be supplemental to
state enforcement powers, in that they
would be exercised in the absence of
state action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
-10-
r--
(recognizing the "primary responsibil-
ities and rights of States"); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 911 at 802.
2. Section 309(a) recognizes the dual
enforcement responsibilities of EPA
and the states. Section 309(a)(1)
gives the EPA administrator the option
of notifying the state and requesting
appropriate enforcement action or
proceeding with unilateral enforcement
action.
3. As a condition of obtaining NPDES
P^
	
	 "delegation," states are required to
have similar statutory enforcement
authority. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(7); 40 C.F.R. § 123.27.
However, even if a state obtains
responsibility for administration of
the NPDES program within its borders,
EPA still retains the right to insti-
tute enforcement action against a
permit holder, with or without prior
notice to, and approval by, the state.
See United States v. City of Colorado 
Springs, 455 F. Supp. 1364, 1366
r	 (D. Colo. 1978).
4. States cannot invoke the federal
enforcement authorities provided under
Section 309, even if they have
received delegation of the NPDES
program. See California v. Department 
of the Navy, 631 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
5. Under Section 309(a)(2), EPA has the
power to "preempt" state enforcement
of the act in cases where widespread
violations of the act are occurring
within the state which has received
delegation of the NPDES program. This
preemption authority has never been
invoked by EPA.
B.	 Issues Created by Dual Enforcement
Authority.
1.	 Case law generally holds that prior
state enforcement action is not a bar
to subsequent EPA enforcement action
on the same matters, even where the
state has assumed authority over the
NPDES program. See United States v. 
Town of Lowell, 637 F. Supp. 254, 257
(N.D. Ind. 1985).
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2. Defendants in enforcement actions
under the CWA have been largely
unsuccessful in asserting the absten-
tion doctrine or any of its variants
to obtain dismissal of duplicative
federal enforcement proceedings. See
United States v. SCM Corp.,
615 F. Supp. 411, 418 (D. Md. 1985).
See also United States v. City of York
and York Sewer Authority, 24 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1637, 1639 (N.D. Pa.
1986). However, one court has relied
upon the doctrine to grant a limited
stay of EPA enforcement action. See
United States v. Cargill, Inc.,
508 F. Supp. 734, 751 (D. Del. 1981).
3. Defendants have raised a number of
other defenses against duplicate
enforcement actions, with limited
success:
a.	 res judicata/collateral estoppel:
See United States v. ITT
Rayonier Inc., 627 F.2d 996,
1000 (9th Cir. 1980) (CWA does
not abrogate res judicata prin-
-13-
ciples; identity of interests
between EPA and the state
precluded relitigation of state
enforcement action); Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620,
633 (D. Md. 1987) (court
requested briefing regarding the
preclusive affects of a state
administrative consent order).
b. laches: See United States v. 
Amoco Oil Company, 580 F. Supp.
1042, 1050 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(defenses rejected even where EPA
waited over four years before
bringing the action); see also
Connecticut Fund for the 
Environment, Inc. v. Upjohn Co.,
660 F. Supp. 1397, 1413 (D. Conn.
1987).
c. mootness by termination of ille-
gal conduct: See Gardeski V. 
Colonial Sand & Stone, Inc.,
501 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (subsequent plant closure
-14-
not a defense to civil action
under similar provisions of the
federal Clean Air Act). But see
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 108
S. Ct. 376, 386 (1987) (in
dicta).
d.	 shifting of compliance obliga-
tions: See Wiconisco Creek
Watershed Ass'n V. Kocher Coal 
Co., 646 F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Pa.
1986) (agreement calling for
construction of wastewater treat-
ment facilities by state Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources
does not absolve defendant from
compliance with CWA require-
ments).
C.	 Impact of the WOA.
The WQA partially addressed the "over-
filing" problem. WQA § 314(a) (to be
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)),
provides that, if either EPA or a state
with an approved NPDES program is "dili-
gently prosecuting" a violation by assess-
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ment of an administrative penalty under new
Section 309(g) or under a "comparable state
law," no civil penalty suit may be
commenced by EPA under Section 309(d).
This provision would not preclude EPA from
seeking injunctive relief or criminal
penalties, nor would it bar a subsequent
state action covering the same violation.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A).
IV.	 PRIVATE CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT UNDER SECTION 505 OF
THE CWA
A.	 Nature of the Actions authorized Under
Section 505.
Section 505 authorizes citizens as "private
attorneys general" to bring actions against
any person "alleged to be in violation" of
the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
Section 505 also authorizes a mandamus type
action against the EPA where there is
alleged a failure to perform a nondiscre-
tionary act. See Id. at 1365(a)(2). The
first type of action has become increas-
ingly more common in recent years, as NPDES
compliance data has become more readily
available to the public, and because EPA's
exercise of its enforcement powers has been
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held to be discretionary in nature. see,
e.g., DuBois v. Thomas, 26 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1209, 1211 (8th dr. 1987).
B.	 Procedural Prerequisites to a Citizen Suit. 
1.	 To ensure that the EPA or the state
has an opportunity to respond to an
NPDES permit violation, the citizen-
plaintiff must first give 60 days
notice of the alleged violation to the
Administrator of EPA, to the state,
and to the alleged violator. See
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A); 40 C.F.R.
Part 135. If the proper notice is
given, EPA or the state must actually
commence an enforcement action by
filing a complaint prior to the filing
of a complaint by the notifying
citizen-plaintiff, otherwise the
citizen suit must be maintained.
Connecticut Fund for the Environment 
v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397
(D. Conn. 1987); Atlantic States Legal 
Foundation, Inc. V. Koch Refining Co.,
27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1358 (D.
Minn. 1988). The 60 day notice
-17-
requirement is jurisdictional; failure
to give notice can result in dismissal
of the action. Walls v. Waste 
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 347 (6th
Cir. 1985). However, the courts have
adopted a pragmatic approach to the
notice requirement; if the regulatory
agencies had actual notice anyway,
formal notice need not be given.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md.
1987). The notice must be suffi-
ciently detailed to identify the
specific effluent limitation or other
standard alleged to have been
violated, the activity alleged to
constitute the violation, and the
persons responsible. See National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co.,
657 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
2.	 Section 504 of WQA requires that the
citizen-plaintiff must also serve a
copy of the complaint on the Attorney
General and EPA. EPA has an oppor-
tunity to intervene in the action as a
-18-
matter of right, and no consent judg-
ment may be entered in the action
unless EPA and the Justice Department
have had an opportunity to review the
proposed consent decree. See
33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3).
C.	 Award of Costs and Attorneys Fees.
1. The WQA also amended Section 505 to
make it clear that litigation costs
will be awarded only to the "prevail-
ing or substantially prevailing
party." This change is in line with
prior court decisions interpreting the
previous version of Section 505(d).
See, e.g., Stoddard v. Western
Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784
F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986).
2. However, the award may be limited if
the trial court determines that the
citizen suit essentially duplicates a
parallel governmental enforcement
action, even where the citizen suit
was filed first. See, Atlantic States
Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Koch
Refining Co., supra.
-19-
D. Statute of Limitations.
The CWA does not contain a statute of limi-
tations provision. In the absence of a
specific statute of limitations, the courts
have usually held that the general federal
five year statute of limitation in
28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to actions under
the CWA. Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1001, 1006
(9th Cir. 1987). In citizen enforcement
actions, the five year statute of limita-
tions period is tolled 60 days before the
filing of the complaint, in order to accom-
modate the statutorily-mandated 60 day
notice provision in Section 505(b)(1). Id.
E. Relationship to Common Law Actions.
According to a recent decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the savings clause of
Section 505(e) does not operate to preclude
CWA preemption of inconsistent state law.
See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 
107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
F. Basic Elements of a Citizen Suit.
1.	 Standing to sue by environmental
groups can be established by a demon-
stration that individual members of
-20-
r
the group engage in recreational
activities near the location of the
subject discharge, and thus are
"adversely affected." See Student
Public Interest Research Group v. 
Jersey Power & Light Co., 24 Env't




	 According to the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 386
P^
	
	 (1987), private citizens may seek
civil penalties against NPDES permit
violators only in a suit brought to
enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing
violation. Citizen-plaintiffs, in
contrast to EPA, cannot seek civil
penalties for wholly past violations.
Private plaintiffs must allege a state
of either continuous or intermittent
violations -- that is, a reasonable
likelihood that a polluter will
continue to pollute in the future.
These allegations of violation must be
r
-21-
made in good faith; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
is the protection against frivolous
claims. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385.
3. The ruling in Gwaltney probably
precludes a citizen suit against a
facility which has terminated opera-
tions, at least where there is no
reasonable likelihood of a resumption
of operations. See Brewer v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,
27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1352, 1357
(M.D. Tenn. 1988).
G.	 Proof of NPDES Permit Violations.
1. The methodology for developing
effluent limitations incorporated in
NPDES permits virtually assures that
such permits will be violated by the
permit holder. See, e.g., American
Petroleum Institute v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 661 F.2d 340 (5th
Cir. 1981).
2. The use of a permit holders' daily
monitoring reports ("DMR's") which are
filed routinely with EPA and the state
is usually the basis for the citizen
-22-
suit. See, e.g., Student Public 
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, 
Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge, and Alcott, 
Inc., 579 F. Supp 1528, 1538 (D.N.J.
1984) aff t d. SRRIG v. Fritzsche. 
Dodge, and Alcott. Inc., 759 F.2d 1131
(3rd dr. 1985); Friends of the Earth
v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1993, 1996
(N.D.N.Y. 1986).
3.	 One issue not clarified in Gwaltney is
how to compute "average" violations of
r	 NPDES permits. Current EPA policy
reflects the Fourth Circuit's approach
in the Gwaltney case. See, Chesapeake
Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Inc., 791 F.2d 304, 314
(4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct.
376 (1987), where the court held that
violations of monthly average limita-
tions in NPDES permits are equivalent
to daily violations for each day of
the month in which the monthly average
is exceeded. But see the district
court's recent ruling in Student
e""
-23-
Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
No. 83-2040 (D.N.J. March 24, 1988),
where the court held that an
exceedance in a single discharge
monitoring sample of the monthly daily
average does not establish a violation
for each and every day of the month.
H.	 Defenses to Citizen Suits.
1.	 Most important is the "diligent
prosecution" defense under
Section 505(b)(1)(8), usually asserted
against an EPA action filed either
concurrently with or after a state
enforcement action. The success of
this defense usually turns on whether
the concurrent or prior state action
is or was a judicial action. Compare,
Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.,
27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1001, 1008
(9th Cir. 1987) and Friends of the
Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that state administrative action
will not bar citizen suits because
-24-
r
they are not actions "in a court")
with the Third Circuit's opposite
conclusion in Baughman v. Bradford
Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 219 (3rd Cir.
1979), cert. denied, Bradford Coal Co. 
V. Baughman, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
2.	 With the enactment of the WQA, state
administrative proceedings now will
operate as a bar to citizen actions
for civil penalties (but not for civil
injunctive relief) if the state agency
is proceeding under a law "comparable"
r
	
	 to the civil administrative penalty
provisions of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), (iii). 	 See also
the recent ruling in Atlantic States
Legal Foundation v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
No. 87-0-13,190 (N.D. Ala. March 4,
1988) (WESTLAW, DCT File, WL 27480)
(where the district court held that a
state administrative order operated as
a bar to a citizen suit, even though
the agency order did not impose civil
penalties, and even though the state
order specifically left the door open
r
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to civil penalty actions by the state
or by third parties).
3. It is likely that the "comparability"
test will focus on the state program's
allowance of public participation in
state enforcement proceedings and by
the amount of penalties which can be
assessed under the state program. See
Student Public Interest Research Group
of New Jersey. Inc. v. Hercules, Inc.,
23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2081, 2086
(D.N.J. 1986).
4. If the state enforcement action is in
a state court, the burden of estab-
lishing "noncomparability" will likely
fall on the citizen-plaintiffs. See
Connecticut Fund for the Environment
v. Contract Plating Co.,  631 F. Supp.
1291 (D. Conn. 1986) (diligence of a
state's prosecution of a defendant
should be presumed).
5. Other defenses to citizen suits have
been largely unsuccessful:
a.	 retroactive permit application to
cover past unauthorized dis-
-26-
charges. see Menzel v. County
Utilities Corp., 14 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1126 (E.D. Va. 1979).
b. upset/bypass defenses. See
Public Interest Research Group of
New Jersey, Inc. v. United States
Metals Refining Co., 26 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2004, 2009
(D.N.J. 1987).
c. non-degradation of the receiving
water by the permit violator.
Public Interest Research Group of
New Jersey, Inc. v. CP Chemicals, 
Inc., 26 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2017, 2021 (D.N.J. 1987).
d. estoppel by agency representa-
tions. Connecticut Fund for the
Environment v. Upjohn Company,
660 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Conn.
1987).
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